Pesachim 21a

אֵין הַכְרָעַת שְׁלִישִׁית מַכְרַעַת. The decision of the third opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, is not considered a decision in this case, as the other two Sages do not raise the issue of a stumbling block at all.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת שֶׁנָּפְלָה לְפָחוֹת מִמֵּאָה סְאָה חוּלִּין טְמֵאִין. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to a barrel of teruma that broke in an upper press and was flowing down into the lower press applies only to a case where one se’a of teruma fell into less than one hundred se’a of impure, non-sacred wine in the lower press.

אֲבָל נָפְלָה לְמֵאָה חוּלִּין טְמֵאִין — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל תֵּרֵד וְתִטַּמֵּא, וְאַל יְטַמְּאֶנָּה בַּיָּד. However, if the teruma wine fell into one hundred se’a of ritually impure, non-sacred produce, everyone agrees that the wine should be allowed to descend and become ritually impure by itself, and one should not actively render it impure with his hand. The reason is that if teruma falls into non-sacred produce one hundred times greater in quantity than itself, the teruma is nullified by the non-sacred produce, and therefore, it would be permitted for a non-priest to eat it. Although it becomes ritually impure, the legal status of the nullified teruma is that of non-sacred produce.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: חָבִית שֶׁנִּשְׁבְּרָה בַּגַּת הָעֶלְיוֹנָה, וְתַחְתֶּיהָ מֵאָה חוּלִּין טְמֵאִין — מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ שֶׁאִם יָכוֹל לְהַצִּיל מִמֶּנָּה רְבִיעִית בְּטׇהֳרָה — יַצִּיל, וְאִם לָאו — תֵּרֵד וְתִטַּמֵּא וְאַל יְטַמְּאֶנָּה בַּיָּד. The Gemara comments: That was also taught in a baraita: With regard to a barrel of teruma wine that broke in the upper winepress, and in the lower press there is one hundred times that amount of ritually impure, non-sacred wine, Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua that if one is able to rescue even a quarter-log from the barrel that broke and keep the wine in a state of ritual purity, he should rescue it. And if not, one should let the teruma wine descend and become impure on its own, but he should not actively render it impure with his hand.

הַאי ״מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ״, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אָמַר רָבָא: אֵיפוֹךְ. After citing proof for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, from this source, the Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita itself. This expression: Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua, is puzzling, as Rabbi Eliezer ruled that one may never directly render the barrel impure. The baraita should say the opposite: Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to Rabbi Eliezer, as it is Rabbi Yehoshua who concedes that one may not render impure the barrel of teruma in the upper vat. Rava said: Reverse the names, so that it is Rabbi Yehoshua who concedes to Rabbi Eliezer.

רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָמַר, לְעוֹלָם לָא תֵּיפוֹךְ: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בִּכְלִי שֶׁתּוֹכוֹ טָהוֹר וְגַבּוֹ טָמֵא. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא נִיגְזוֹר דִּילְמָא נָגַע גַּבּוֹ בִּתְרוּמָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Actually, do not reverse the names. Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are referring to a case where it is possible to collect the wine only in a vessel whose interior is ritually pure and whose exterior is impure by rabbinic law, having become impure through contact with impure liquids. Lest you say that we should issue a decree that one may not rescue even a quarter-log, lest the vessel’s exterior touch the teruma and render it impure, the baraita teaches us that Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua that despite that concern, it is permitted to rescue a quarter-log of pure teruma.

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל שָׁעָה שֶׁמּוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל, מַאֲכִיל לַבְּהֵמָה לַחַיָּה וְלָעוֹפוֹת, וּמוֹכֵר לַנׇּכְרִי, וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָתוֹ. עָבַר זְמַנּוֹ — אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָתוֹ, וְלֹא יַסִּיק בּוֹ תַּנּוּר וְכִירַיִם. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין בִּיעוּר חָמֵץ אֶלָּא שְׂרֵיפָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַף מְפָרֵר וְזוֹרֶה לְרוּחַ אוֹ מֵטִיל לַיָּם. MISHNA: For the entire time that it is permitted to eat leavened bread, one may also feed it to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds; and one may sell it to a gentile; and it is permitted to derive benefit from it. After its time passes, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, and one may not even light an oven or a stove with leavened bread. With regard to the manner of removal of leavened bread, Rabbi Yehuda says: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. And the Rabbis say: Burning is not required, as one may even crumble it and throw it into the wind or cast it into the sea.

גְּמָ׳ כׇּל שָׁעָה שֶׁמּוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל — מַאֲכִיל, הָא כׇּל שָׁעָה שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל — אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל. לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. דְּאִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָא אִיכָּא חָמֵשׁ דְּאֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל — וּמַאֲכִיל. דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אוֹכְלִין כׇּל חָמֵשׁ, וְשׂוֹרְפִין בִּתְחִלַּת שֵׁשׁ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אוֹכְלִין כׇּל אַרְבַּע, וְתוֹלִין כׇּל חָמֵשׁ, וְשׂוֹרְפִין בִּתְחִלַּת שֵׁשׁ! GEMARA: The Gemara reads the mishna precisely: For the entire time that it is permitted to eat leavened bread, one may feed it to his animals. However, apparently, for the entire time that it is not permitted to eat leavened bread, one may not feed his animals. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, isn’t there the fifth hour, when one may not eat leavened bread but one may feed it to his animals? As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Meir says: One may eat leavened bread on the morning of the fourteenth day of Nisan for the entire fifth hour, and he burns it at the beginning of the sixth hour. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may eat it for the entire fourth hour, he suspends his consumption of it for the entire fifth hour, and he burns it at the beginning of the sixth hour. Apparently, there is an hour in which it is prohibited to eat leavened bread, but it is permitted to feed it to one’s animals.

וְאֶלָּא מַאי, רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא? הַאי ״כׇּל שָׁעָה שֶׁמּוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מַאֲכִיל״ — ״כׇּל שָׁעָה שֶׁאוֹכֵל מַאֲכִיל״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ. The Gemara asks: Rather, what can be said? This mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir. If so, this statement: For the entire time that it is permitted to eat leavened bread one may feed, is imprecise. It should have said: For the entire time that one eats leavened bread he may feed. As it stands, there is no parallel between the phrase: It is permitted to eat, and the phrase: One may feed. Therefore, it appears that the mishna is referring to two different people or cases.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: מַתְנִיתִין רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא. דִּתְנַן, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: חוּלִּין נֶאֱכָלִין כׇּל אַרְבַּע, תְּרוּמָה כׇּל חָמֵשׁ, וְשׂוֹרְפִין בִּתְחִלַּת שֵׁשׁ. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: כׇּל שָׁעָה שֶׁמּוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל כֹּהֵן בִּתְרוּמָה, יִשְׂרָאֵל מַאֲכִיל חוּלִּין לַבְּהֵמָה לַחַיָּה וְלָעוֹפוֹת. Rabba bar Ulla said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. As we learned in a mishna that Rabban Gamliel says: Non-sacred leavened bread may be eaten on the fourteenth of Nisan during the entire fourth hour, leavened bread that is teruma may be eaten during the entire fifth hour, and one burns the leavened bread at the beginning of the sixth hour. And this is what the mishna is saying: For the entire time that it is permitted for a priest to partake of teruma, although an Israelite may not eat leavened bread at that time, an Israelite may feed non-sacred food to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds.

לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנָא בְּהֵמָה, לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנָא חַיָּה? צְרִיכָא. דְּאִי תְּנָא בְּהֵמָה — דְּאִי מְשַׁיְּירָא חָזֵי לַהּ. אֲבָל חַיָּה, דְּאִי מְשַׁיְּירָא קָמַצְנְעָא לַהּ — אֵימָא לָא. The Gemara continues to read the mishna precisely. The mishna states that one may feed his leavened bread to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach about the case of domesticated animals, and why do I need it to teach about non-domesticated animals as well? The halakha should be the same for both cases. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach us both cases, as had it taught only about domesticated animals, one would have said that it is permitted feed them because if the animal leaves over some leavened bread one will see what is left over and dispose of it. However, with regard to a non-domesticated animal, if it leaves over any of the leavened bread, it hides it to save for later. Therefore, one could say that it is not permitted to feed it so close to the time when leavened bread is prohibited.

וְאִי תְּנָא חַיָּה — מִשּׁוּם דְּאִי מְשַׁיְּירָא מִיהַת מַצְנְעָא. אֲבָל בְּהֵמָה, זִימְנִין דִּמְשַׁיְּירָא וְלָא מַסֵּיק אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ, וְקָאֵי עֲלֵיהּ בְּ״בַל יֵרָאֶה וּבְבַל יִמָּצֵא״ — אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא. And had it taught only the case of a non-domesticated animal, one might say that it is permitted to feed leavened bread to such an animal because if it leaves over any food in any case it will hide it, and the owner will not violate the prohibition: It shall not be seen. However, with regard to a domesticated animal, sometimes it leaves over food, and it does not enter his mind that the animal will do so. And in that case both prohibitions: It shall not be seen and it shall not be found, would apply to him. Consequently, one could say that it would not be permitted for him to feed a domesticated animal. Therefore, it was necessary to teach both cases.

עוֹפוֹת לְמָה לִי? אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא בְּהֵמָה וְחַיָּה, תְּנָא נָמֵי עוֹפוֹת. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to mention birds as well? The Gemara answers: There is no inherent need to mention birds; however, since the mishna taught the cases of domesticated animals and non-domesticated animals, it also taught the case of birds, as these are normally grouped together.

וּמוֹכְרוֹ לְגוֹי. פְּשִׁיטָא! לְאַפּוֹקֵי מֵהַאי תַּנָּא דְּתַנְיָא, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: לֹא יִמְכּוֹר אָדָם חֲמֵצוֹ לְגוֹי אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדֵעַ בּוֹ שֶׁיִּכְלֶה קוֹדֶם פֶּסַח. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל שָׁעָה שֶׁמּוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל — מוּתָּר לִמְכּוֹר. It was stated in the mishna that whenever it is permitted to eat leavened bread, one may also sell it to a gentile. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, as the mishna already taught that one may benefit from it? The Gemara answers: This is stated to exclude the opinion of this tanna, as it was taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell his leavened bread to a gentile unless he knows that the leavened bread will be consumed before Passover. According to Beit Shammai, a person retains some responsibility for his leavened bread even when it is no longer in his possession. And Beit Hillel say: For the entire time that it is permitted for a Jew to eat leavened bread, it is also permitted for him to sell it to a gentile. The Jew ceases to be responsible for leavened bread sold to a gentile from the moment it is sold.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא אוֹמֵר: כּוּתָּח וְכׇל מִינֵי כוּתָּח — אָסוּר לִמְכּוֹר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם קוֹדֶם לַפֶּסַח. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who agrees in principle with Beit Shammai’s opinion, says: With regard to kutaḥ, a dip that contains leavened breadcrumbs, and all types of kutaḥ, it is prohibited to sell it to a gentile thirty days before Passover. Because kutaḥ is spicy, people use only a bit at a time, so it will likely last until Passover.

וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה. פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא שֶׁחֲרָכוֹ קוֹדֶם זְמַנּוֹ. וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: חֲרָכוֹ קוֹדֶם זְמַנּוֹ — מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה אֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר זְמַנּוֹ. It was stated in the mishna that as long as leavened bread may be eaten, it is permitted to derive benefit from it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this in a case where one charred the leavened bread with fire before its time, i.e., before it became prohibited, rendering it inedible. And it teaches us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava. As Rava said: If one charred leavened bread before its time, it is permitted to derive benefit from it even after its time, since it no longer has the legal status of leavened bread.

עָבַר זְמַנּוֹ אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָתוֹ. פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, לְשָׁעוֹת דְּרַבָּנַן. דְּאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ מִשֵּׁשׁ שָׁעוֹת וּלְמַעְלָה, אֲפִילּוּ בְּחִיטֵּי קוּרְדִּנְיָתָא — אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְקִדּוּשִׁין. It was stated in the mishna: After its time passes, it is prohibited to benefit from it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the mishna to teach that it remains prohibited to benefit from leavened bread during additional hours that are delineated by rabbinic law. As Rav Giddel said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to one who takes wheat grains that may have come into contact with water and become leavened and betroths a woman with the leaven from the beginning of the sixth hour, when the leaven is prohibited by rabbinic law, and onward on Passover eve, even if he betrothed her with wheat from the mountains, which is especially hard and unlikely to become leavened, nonetheless, we are not concerned that this betrothal is valid. This is because when performing a betrothal with money one must give the woman an object worth as least the value of a peruta, and leaven from which one is prohibited to benefit is considered worthless.

וְלֹא יַסִּיק בּוֹ תַּנּוּר וְכִירַיִם. פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר אֵין בִּיעוּר חָמֵץ אֶלָּא שְׂרֵיפָה. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מִצְוָתוֹ בִּשְׂרֵיפָה, בַּהֲדֵי דְּקָא שָׂרֵיף לֵיהּ לִיתְהֲנֵי מִינֵּיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. It was stated in the mishna: And one may not even light an oven or a stove with leavened bread once it becomes prohibited. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, as this is also a type of benefit? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this due to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that the removal of leavened bread is to be performed only through burning. Otherwise, it could enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Yehuda said that its mitzva is performed through burning, while one is burning it let him benefit from it. Therefore, it teaches us that it is prohibited to benefit from leavened bread even while burning it.

אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: מִנַּיִן לְחָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח שֶׁאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל חָמֵץ״ — לֹא יְהֵא בּוֹ הֶיתֵּר אֲכִילָה: טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל חָמֵץ״, הָא לָא כְּתַב ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה — מַשְׁמַע, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה — לָא מַשְׁמַע. Ḥizkiya said: From where is it derived in the mishna that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread on Passover? As it is stated: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten” (Exodus 13:3). Since the verse uses the passive, it should be understood as follows: There shall be no permitted consumption of it at all, even deriving benefit, as benefit could be exchanged for money, which could be used to buy food. The Gemara reads precisely: The reason deriving benefit is prohibited is that the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten.” Had the Torah not written: “Shall not be eaten,” and instead used the active form: You shall not eat, I would have said that the prohibition of eating is implied but that the prohibition of deriving benefit is not implied.

וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, ״לֹא תֹאכַל״, ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ״ — אֶחָד אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה וְאֶחָד אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה (מַשְׁמַע), עַד שֶׁיִּפְרֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁפָּרַט לְךָ בִּנְבֵילָה. The Gemara comments: And this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that wherever it is stated: “It shall not be eaten,” “You, singular, shall not eat,” or “You, plural, shall not eat,” both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit are implied, unless the verse specifies that one may benefit, in the manner that it specified with regard to an unslaughtered animal carcass.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇּל נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ אוֹ מָכֹר לְנׇכְרִי וְגוֹ׳״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא לַגֵּר בִּנְתִינָה וְלַגּוֹי בִּמְכִירָה. לַגֵּר בִּמְכִירָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה אוֹ מָכֹר״. לַגּוֹי בִּנְתִינָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ אוֹ מָכֹר לְנָכְרִי״. נִמְצֵאתָ אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד גֵּר וְאֶחָד גּוֹי, בֵּין בִּמְכִירָה בֵּין בִּנְתִינָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. As it was taught in a baraita: “You shall not eat of any unslaughtered animal; you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:21). I have derived only that it is permitted to a resident alien through giving and to a gentile through selling. From where do I derive that it is permitted to a resident alien through selling? The verse states: “You may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates…or you may sell it,” meaning that one has the option to do either of these. From where is it derived that it is permitted to a gentile through giving and one is not required to sell it to him? The verse states: “You may give it…that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a foreigner.” Therefore, you may say that he may transfer it to both a resident alien and a gentile, both through giving and through selling. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, דְּבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן: לַגֵּר בִּנְתִינָה וְלַגּוֹי בִּמְכִירָה. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כִּדְאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר, לִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ וּמָכֹר״. ״אוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לִדְבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן. The baraita concludes: Rabbi Yehuda says: These matters are meant to be understood as they are written; he may transfer an unslaughtered animal carcass to a resident alien only through giving and to a gentile only through selling. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers: If it could enter your mind to understand the verse in accordance with that which Rabbi Meir said, then let the Merciful One write: You may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates that he may eat it and sell it to a foreigner. Why do I need the word “or” between these two options? Learn from it that the matters are to be understood as they are written.

וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר? ״אוֹ״ לְהַקְדִּים נְתִינָה דְגֵר לִמְכִירָה דְּגוֹי. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? הָא לָא צָרִיךְ קְרָא: כֵּיוָן דְּגֵר אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה לְהַחְיוֹתוֹ, וְגוֹי אִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ, לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, סְבָרָא הוּא. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir explain the formulation of the verse? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Meir would explain that the word “or” teaches one to give precedence to giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile. The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yehuda derive this halakha? According to Rabbi Yehuda, this matter does not need a verse, since you are commanded to sustain a resident alien, as it is a mitzva for one to sustain a resident alien who has renounced idol worship, and you are not commanded to sustain a gentile. There is no need for a verse to teach this; it is based on a logical inference.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: אֶחָד גֵּר וְאֶחָד גּוֹי, בֵּין בִּמְכִירָה בֵּין בִּנְתִינָה. מִדְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמִישְׁרֵא נְבֵילָה בַּהֲנָאָה — הָא כׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה אֲסוּרִין בֵּין בַּאֲכִילָה בֵּין בַּהֲנָאָה. The Gemara applies this discussion to the previously mentioned topic. Granted, Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion is reasonable according to Rabbi Meir, who said that one may transfer an animal carcass to both a convert and a gentile, both through selling and through giving. From the fact that a verse was necessary to permit one to derive benefit from an animal carcass, one can learn that with regard to all other prohibitions in the Torah about which it states only that one may not eat an item, it is prohibited both to eat it and to derive benefit from it.

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: לִדְבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן הוּא דַּאֲתָא — הָא כׇּל אִיסּוּרִים שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה מְנָא לֵיהּ דַּאֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״לַּכֶּלֶב תַּשְׁלִיכוּן אֹתוֹ״. However, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that the word “or” comes to teach that the matters are to be understood as they are written, from where does he derive with regard to all prohibitions of eating mentioned in the Torah that it is prohibited to derive benefit as well? The Gemara answers: He derives it from another verse. It is stated with regard to an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa]: “And you shall be sacred men to Me, therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30).

אוֹתוֹ אַתָּה מַשְׁלִיךְ לַכֶּלֶב, וְאִי אַתָּה מַשְׁלִיךְ לַכֶּלֶב כׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר? אוֹתוֹ אַתָּה מַשְׁלִיךְ לַכֶּלֶב, וְאִי אַתָּה מַשְׁלִיךְ לַכֶּלֶב חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה. The Gemara concludes: It, i.e., a tereifa, you may throw to a dog, but you may not throw all other items prohibited by Torah law to a dog, as both eating and deriving benefit are prohibited. The Gemara asks: And what halakha does Rabbi Meir learn from this verse? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Meir draws the following inference: It, you may throw to a dog, but you may not throw the meat of a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard to a dog, as it is prohibited to benefit from it.

וְאִידַּךְ? חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא. And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, learn this halakha about non-sacrificial meat that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: He holds that the prohibition of deriving benefit from the meat of a non-sacrificial animal that was slaughtered in the courtyard is not by Torah law; rather, the Sages decreed that it is prohibited. Since it is not prohibited by Torah law, no verse is necessary.

מֵתִיב רַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא: וַהֲרֵי גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״עַל כֵּן לֹא יֹאכְלוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה״, וּתְנַן: שׁוֹלֵחַ אָדָם יָרֵךְ לְגוֹי, וְגִיד הַנָּשֶׁה בְּתוֹכוֹ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּקוֹמוֹ נִיכָּר! Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raised an objection: And yet there is still the prohibition of the sciatic nerve, as the Merciful One says: “Therefore the children of Israel may not eat the sciatic nerve” (Genesis 32:33), and we learned in a mishna: A person may send the thigh of an animal to a gentile as a gift with the sciatic nerve inside it, he is not required to remove it. This is due to the fact that its place is clear, and it is obvious that this nerve has not been removed. Therefore, there is no concern that another Jew will assume that the first Jew removed this portion of the animal, which might cause him to accidentally eat the sciatic nerve. Apparently, one may benefit from this prohibited portion of the animal even though the verse says that one may not eat it.

קָסָבַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה נְבֵילָה — הִיא וְחֶלְבָּהּ וְגִידָהּ הוּתְּרָה. הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״יֵשׁ בְּגִידִין בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם״. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״אֵין בְּגִידִין בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם״, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Abbahu holds that when it was permitted by the Torah to derive benefit from an animal carcass, it, its fats, and its sinews, such as the sciatic nerve, were all permitted. Therefore, the sciatic nerve is included in this exception and one may benefit from it. The Gemara challenges: It works out well according to the one who said that sinews give flavor, meaning that they have the taste of meat and therefore have the legal status of meat of an animal carcass. However, according to the one who says that sinews do not give flavor and are not categorized as meat, what can be said? If they are not considered to be meat, why are they included in the exception made for an animal carcass?

מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר ״אֵין בְּגִידִין בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם״ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹכֵל מִגִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְחַיֵּיב שְׁתַּיִם, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. The Gemara answers: Whom did you hear that said that sinews do not give flavor? It is Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who eats the sciatic nerve from a non-kosher domesticated animal, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to receive two sets of lashes: One for eating the sciatic nerve and one for eating the meat of a non-kosher animal. And Rabbi Shimon exempts him entirely, since according to his opinion the prohibition to eat the sciatic nerve applies only to a kosher animal. In addition, one violates the prohibition of eating from a non-kosher animal only when it has the flavor of meat.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָכִי נָמֵי דְּאָסַר בַּהֲנָאָה, דְּתַנְיָא: גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹסֵר. And it indeed follows logically that just as Rabbi Shimon exempts one who eats the sciatic nerve in that particular case, so too here, Rabbi Shimon prohibits deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve. As it was taught in a baraita: It is permitted to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon prohibits it. Since Rabbi Shimon holds that the sciatic nerve does not give flavor, it cannot be included in the exception of the animal carcass. Therefore, from the verse that prohibits eating the sciatic nerve he learns that one may not benefit from it either, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu. Rabbi Abbahu’s position fits according to both opinions. However, the mishna that indicates that it is permitted to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as he holds that the sciatic nerve gives flavor and is therefore included in the exception of the animal carcass.

וַהֲרֵי דָּם, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״כׇּל נֶפֶשׁ מִכֶּם לֹא תֹאכַל דָּם״, וּתְנַן: אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ מִתְעָרְבִין בָּאַמָּה, וְיוֹצְאִין לְנַחַל קִדְרוֹן, וְנִמְכָּרִין לַגַּנָּנִין לְזַבֵּל, וּמוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ! The Gemara further challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition of eating blood, as the Merciful One says: “Therefore I said to the children of Israel: No soul of you shall eat blood, neither shall any convert that dwells among you eat blood” (Leviticus 17:12). According to Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion, one may derive from this verse that in addition to the prohibition against eating blood, it is prohibited to benefit from it as well. And we learned in a mishna: Both these and these, the remnants of the blood from sin-offerings brought on the altar and other blood sprinkled on it, descend and mix in the canal from which water leaves the Temple. They then exit to the Kidron Valley and are sold at a special price to gardeners as a fertilizer. And one who does not first purchase the blood from the Temple misuses consecrated property. Apparently, under certain circumstances, one may benefit from blood which it is prohibited to consume.

שָׁאנֵי דָּם דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ לְמַיִם, דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִם״ — מָה מַיִם מוּתָּרִין, אַף דָּם מוּתָּר. The Gemara answers: Blood is different, as it is juxtaposed in the Torah to water. As it is written with regard to blood: “You shall not eat it; you shall pour it out upon the earth like water” (Deuteronomy 12:24). From here it is derived: Just as it is permitted to benefit from water, so too, it is permitted to benefit from blood.

וְאֵימָא, כַּמַּיִם הַמִּתְנַסְּכִים עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ! אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ ״כַּמַּיִם״ — רוֹב מַיִם. מִידֵּי ״רוֹב מַיִם״ כְּתִיב?! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כַּמַּיִם הַנִּשְׁפָּכִין, וְלֹא כַּמַּיִם הַנִּיסָּכִין. The Gemara asks: And say instead that blood is meant to be like water offered as a libation on the altar, which is consecrated and from which one is prohibited to benefit. Rabbi Abbahu said: The comparison to permitted water can be deduced from that which the verse says: “Like water [kamayim],” meaning, like most water; and one is permitted to benefit from most types of water. The Gemara asks: And is it written: Most water? The Torah wrote: “Like water,” which could indicate a comparison to any type of water. Rather, Rav Ashi said that the verse should be understood as follows: Like water that is poured out, from which one may benefit, and not like water that is offered as a libation. Water offered on the altar is described using the term libation, and not using the term poured as found in the verse.

וְאֵימָא: כַּמַּיִם הַנִּשְׁפָּכִין לִפְנֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה! הָתָם נָמֵי נִיסּוּךְ אִיקְּרִי, דִּכְתִיב ״יִשְׁתּוּ יֵין נְסִיכָם״. The Gemara asks: And say that blood is meant to be like water poured before idolatry, from which one may not benefit. The Gemara rejects this: There, that is also called a libation and not pouring, as it is written: “Who did eat the fat of their sacrifices, and drink the wine of their libations” (Deuteronomy 32:38).

וּלְחִזְקִיָּה, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא אִיתַּקַּשׁ דָּם לְמַיִם? לְכִדְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מִנַּיִן לְדַם קָדָשִׁים שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַכְשִׁיר — שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִם״, דָּם שֶׁנִּשְׁפָּךְ כַּמַּיִם — מַכְשִׁיר, שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִשְׁפָּךְ כַּמַּיִם — אֵינוֹ מַכְשִׁיר. The Gemara asks: According to Ḥizkiya, who says that: You shall not eat, indicates only that eating is prohibited but that benefit is permitted, for what halakha is blood juxtaposed to water? According to his opinion, there is no need for the verse to teach that one may benefit from blood. The Gemara answers that he needs this verse to derive that which was taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that the blood of sacrifices does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity? As it is stated: “You shall not eat it; you shall pour it out upon the earth like water” (Deuteronomy 12:24). Blood that is poured out like water, such as that of a slaughtered, non-sacrificial animal, renders food susceptible to ritual impurity. However, sacrificial blood, which is not poured out like water and is instead sprinkled on the altar, does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity.

וַהֲרֵי אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא תֹאכַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ עִם הַבָּשָׂר״, וְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יוֹשִׁיט אָדָם כּוֹס יַיִן לְנָזִיר וְאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי לִבְנֵי נֹחַ — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְלִפְנֵי עִוֵּר לֹא תִתֵּן מִכְשֹׁל״, הָא לִכְלָבִים — שְׁרֵי! The Gemara further challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition against eating a limb cut from a living animal, as it is written: “Only be steadfast in not eating the blood; for the blood is the life; and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23). And it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that a person may not offer a cup of wine to a nazirite, who is prohibited from drinking wine, and that he may not offer a limb cut from a living animal to a descendant of Noah, who is prohibited by Noahide law from eating a limb from a living animal? The verse states: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). Causing another person to sin is like placing a stumbling block before a blind person; one who does so violates this prohibition. The prohibition of giving a limb from a living animal to a gentile is apparently due only to the prohibition of placing a stumbling block. However, it is permitted for one to throw it to dogs. Therefore, despite the fact that the verse says: “You shall not eat it,” apparently there is no prohibition against benefiting from this prohibited item. This challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s principle.

שָׁאנֵי אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ לְדָם, דִּכְתִיב: ״רַק חֲזַק לְבִלְתִּי אֲכֹל הַדָּם כִּי הַדָּם הוּא הַנָּפֶשׁ״. The Gemara answers: A limb from a living animal is different, as it is juxtaposed in the Torah to blood. As it is written: “Only be steadfast in not eating the blood; for the blood is the life; and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23). Just as it is permitted to benefit from blood, it is likewise permitted to benefit from a limb torn from a living animal.

וּלְחִזְקִיָּה, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא אִיתַּקַּשׁ אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי לְדָם? אָמַר לָךְ, דָּם הוּא דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ לְאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי: מָה אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי אָסוּר — אַף דָּם מִן הַחַי אָסוּר. וְאִי זֶה — זֶה דַּם הַקָּזָה, שֶׁהַנֶּפֶשׁ יוֹצְאָה בּוֹ. The Gemara asks: And according to Ḥizkiya, in order to teach what halakha is the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal juxtaposed to the prohibition against eating blood? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the juxtaposition comes to teach the opposite. It is blood that is juxtaposed to a limb from a living animal to teach the following: Just as a limb from a living animal is prohibited, so too, blood of a living being is prohibited. And to which blood is this referring? This is referring to blood spilled in the process of bloodletting, through which the soul departs. That is considered to be blood from a living being, and even the descendants of Noah are prohibited from eating it (Rabbeinu Ḥananel).

וַהֲרֵי שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״, וְתַנְיָא: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״סָקוֹל יִסָּקֵל הַשּׁוֹר״ אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהִיא נְבֵלָה, וּנְבֵלָה אֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה?! וּמָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״? מַגִּיד לְךָ הַכָּתוּב שֶׁאִם שְׁחָטוֹ לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּגְמַר (אֶת) דִּינוֹ — אָסוּר. The Gemara asks: And yet there is the prohibition against eating the meat from an ox that is stoned, as the Merciful One says: “And if an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be surely stoned, and of its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be clear” (Exodus 21:28). And it was taught in a baraita: By inference from that which is stated: “The ox shall surely be stoned,” in which case it is not to be slaughtered properly, don’t I know that it is an animal carcass, and it is prohibited to eat an animal carcass? What does it mean when the verse states: “Its flesh shall not be eaten”? The verse is telling you that even if one slaughtered the ox after its verdict had been reached but before it had been carried out, it is still prohibited.

אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילָה, בַּהֲנָאָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וּבַעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״. מַאי מַשְׁמַע? שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא אוֹמֵר: כְּאָדָם שֶׁאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״יָצָא פְּלוֹנִי נָקִי מִנְּכָסָיו״, וְאֵין לוֹ בָּהֶם הֲנָאָה שֶׁל כְּלוּם. The baraita continues: I have derived only that one is prohibited from eating this ox; from where do I derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from it as well? The verse states: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear [naki].” The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that one may not benefit from this ox? Shimon ben Zoma says: This is like a person who says to his fellow: So-and-so was left clear [naki] of his property, and he has no benefit from it at all. Similarly, “But the owner of the ox shall be clear” means that he has no benefit from the ox.

טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב ״וּבַעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״, דְּאִי מִ״לֹּא יֵאָכֵל״, אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה — מַשְׁמַע, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה — לָא מַשְׁמַע! The Gemara infers from the verse that the reason that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the ox is that the Torah specifically wrote: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear.” As, if this prohibition were derived from: “It shall not be eaten,” apparently the prohibition of eating would be implied, but the prohibition of deriving benefit would not be implied. This presents a challenge even for Ḥizkiya, who agrees that the passive formulation: “It shall not be eaten,” indicates that in addition one may not benefit from the item.

לְעוֹלָם ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״ אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה וְאִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה מַשְׁמַע, ״וּבַעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ לַהֲנָאַת עוֹרוֹ הוּא דַּאֲתָא. וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״ כְּתִיב: בְּשָׂרוֹ — אִין, עוֹרוֹ — לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. The Gemara answers: Actually, the phrase: “It shall not be eaten” indicates both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit. And the phrase: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear,” comes to prohibit deriving benefit from the hide of the ox that has been stoned. And it is necessary to mention this explicitly, as it could enter your mind to say that since it is written: “Its flesh shall not be eaten,” with regard to its flesh, yes, it is prohibited, but with regard to its hide, no, it is not. Therefore, the verse teaches us that it is prohibited to benefit from its hide as well.

וּלְהָנָךְ תַּנָּאֵי דְּמַפְּקִי לֵיהּ לְהַאי קְרָא לִדְרָשָׁה אַחֲרִינָא, לַחֲצִי כּוֹפֶר וְלִדְמֵי וְולָדוֹת, הֲנָאַת עוֹרוֹ מְנָא לְהוּ? נָפְקָא לְהוּ מֵ״אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״ — אֶת הַטָּפֵל לִבְשָׂרוֹ. The Gemara asks: And according to those tanna’im who expound this verse: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear,” for another interpretation, namely, to teach that the owner of an innocuous ox, i.e., one that is not known to cause damage with the intent to injure, is exempt from the payment of half of the indemnity if that ox killed a person, or that he is exempt from payment for offspring if his ox gores a pregnant woman and causes her to miscarry; from where do they derive this prohibition against benefiting from the ox’s hide? The Gemara answers: They derive this halakha from the wording: “Of [et] its flesh.” The verse could have been formulated: And its flesh shall not be eaten. The addition of the word et comes to include that which is secondary to the flesh, i.e., the hide.

וְאִידַּךְ? ״אֶת״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ. The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, who derives the prohibition against benefiting from the hide from the verse: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear,” what does he learn from the additional word et? The Gemara answers: This Sage does not interpret the word et as a means to derive new halakhot. He considers the word et to be an ordinary part of the sentence structure and not a source for exegetical exposition.

כִּדְתַנְיָא: שִׁמְעוֹן הָעַמְסוֹנִי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ נְחֶמְיָה הָעַמְסוֹנִי, הָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ כׇּל ׳אֶתִּים׳ שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיעַ לְ״אֶת ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ תִּירָא״ פֵּירַשׁ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ תַּלְמִידָיו: רַבִּי, כׇּל ׳אֶתִּים׳ שֶׁדָּרַשְׁתָּ מָה תְּהֵא עֲלֵיהֶן? אָמַר לָהֶם: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁקִּבַּלְתִּי שָׂכָר עַל הַדְּרִישָׁה, כָּךְ אֲנִי מְקַבֵּל שָׂכָר עַל הַפְּרִישָׁה. עַד שֶׁבָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְדָרַשׁ: ״אֶת ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ תִּירָא״ — לְרַבּוֹת תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים. As it was taught in a baraita: Shimon HaAmmassoni, and some say that it was Neḥemya HaAmmassoni, would interpret all occurrences of the word et in the Torah, deriving additional halakhot with regard to the particular subject matter. Once he reached the verse: “You shall be in awe of [et] the Lord your God; you shall serve Him; and to Him you shall cleave, and by His name you shall swear” (Deuteronomy 10:20), he withdrew from this method of exposition, as how could one add to God Himself? His students said to him: Rabbi, what will be with all the etim that you interpreted until now? He said to them: Just as I received reward for the interpretation, so I shall receive reward for my withdrawal from using this method of exposition. The word et in this verse was not explained until Rabbi Akiva came and expounded: “You shall be in awe of [et] the Lord your God”: The word et comes to include Torah scholars, and one is commanded to fear them just as one fears God. In any case, Shimon HaAmmassoni no longer derived additional halakhot from the word et.

וַהֲרֵי עׇרְלָה, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״עֲרֵלִים לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, וְתַנְיָא: ״עֲרֵלִים לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה. מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יֵהָנֶה מִמֶּנּוּ, שֶׁלֹּא יִצְבַּע בּוֹ, וְלֹא יַדְלִיק בּוֹ אֶת הַנֵּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וַעֲרַלְתֶּם עׇרְלָתוֹ ... עֲרֵלִים לֹא יֵאָכֵל״ — לְרַבּוֹת אֶת כּוּלָּם. The Gemara further challenges: And yet there is the prohibition of fruit that grows on a tree during the first three years after it was planted [orla], as the Merciful One says: “And when you come into the land, and you shall plant all types of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit thereof as prohibited; three years shall it be prohibited [arelim] to you; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23). And it was taught in a baraita: “Shall it be prohibited to you; it shall not be eaten”: I have only derived a prohibition to eat it. From where do I derive that one may not even benefit from it, e.g., that he may not paint with the dye that can be extracted from the fruit, nor may he light a lamp with its oil? The verse states: “You shall count the fruit thereof [orlato] as prohibited [araltem]; three years shall it be prohibited [arelim] to you; it shall not be eaten.” This repetition of the term arel comes to include all forms of benefit.

טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וַעֲרַלְתֶּם עׇרְלָתוֹ ... עֲרֵלִים״, הָא לָאו הָכִי, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה — מַשְׁמַע, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה — לָא מַשְׁמַע! The Gemara reads precisely: The reason that all forms of benefit are prohibited is that the Merciful One writes: “You shall count the fruit thereof as prohibited [araltem]; three years shall it be prohibited [arelim].” The double use of the word arel indicates a two-fold prohibition. However, were that not the case, I would have said: The prohibition of eating is indicated here; however, the prohibition to derive benefit is not indicated. This is a challenge even to Ḥizkiya’s opinion, as the verse says: “It shall not be eaten,” indicating that it is prohibited to derive benefit as well.

לְעוֹלָם ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״ מַשְׁמַע בֵּין אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה בֵּין אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה, וְשָׁאנֵי הָתָם דִּכְתִיב ״לָכֶם״. וְאִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וּכְתַב ״לָכֶם״ — שֶׁלָּכֶם יְהֵא, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן. The Gemara rejects this. Actually, in general, “it shall not be eaten” indicates both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition to derive benefit. However, it is different there, with regard to orla, as it is written: “Three years shall it be prohibited [arelim] to you.” And, therefore, it was necessary for the verse to repeat the prohibition using several terms, as it could enter your mind to say that since it wrote “to you” it means that it shall be yours, namely that one is permitted to benefit from it. Therefore, it teaches us that it is prohibited to derive benefit.

וְאֶלָּא הַשְׁתָּא דִּכְתִיבִי הָנָךְ קְרָאֵי, ״לָכֶם״ לְמָה לִי? לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״לָכֶם״, לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַנָּטוּעַ The Gemara asks: However, now that these words in the verses are written, indicating the prohibition to derive benefit from orla, why do I need the words “to you,” i.e., what does this phrase teach us here? The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a baraita: That which is stated: “To you,” comes to include that which is planted

לְרַבִּים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַנָּטוּעַ לְרַבִּים. for the public; all the details of the prohibition of orla apply to a tree planted for public purposes. Rabbi Yehuda says: This verse comes to exclude a tree planted for the public, i.e., it is exempt from the laws of orla.

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא — דִּכְתִיב ״וּנְטַעְתֶּם״, לְיָחִיד מַשְׁמַע, לְרַבִּים לָא מַשְׁמַע. כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לָכֶם״ — לְהָבִיא אֶת הַנָּטוּעַ לְרַבִּים. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: ״וּנְטַעְתֶּם״ מַשְׁמַע בֵּין לְרַבִּים בֵּין לְיָחִיד, וְ״לָכֶם״ בֵּין יָחִיד בֵּין רַבִּים מַשְׁמַע. הָוֵי רִבּוּי אַחַר רִבּוּי — וְאֵין רִבּוּי אַחַר רִבּוּי אֶלָּא לְמַעֵט. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna? As it is written: “And you shall plant.” That the mitzva applies to an individual is indicated, since planting a tree is ordinarily an individual activity; however, that the mitzva of orla applies to a tree planted for the public is not indicated by the verse. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “for you” in the plural, to include within this prohibition that which is planted for the public. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the phrase “and you shall plant” indicates that orla applies both to a tree planted for the public and for an individual; and the phrase “for you” also indicates that orla applies both to a tree planted for an individual and for the public. If so, then this is one amplificatory expression after another, and there is a principle that one amplificatory expression after another is restrictive. Therefore, the term: “For you” comes to exclude from this prohibition a tree planted for the public.

וַהֲרֵי תְּרוּמָה, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״וְכׇל זָר לֹא יֹאכַל קֹדֶשׁ״, וּתְנַן: מְעָרְבִין לְנָזִיר בְּיַיִן, וּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל בִּתְרוּמָה! The Gemara further challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition that a non-priest shall not eat teruma, as the Merciful One says: “No stranger shall eat of the sacred food; a tenant of a priest, or a hired servant, shall not eat of the sacred food” (Leviticus 22:10). And we learned in a mishna: One may establish an eiruv, such as a joining of Shabbat boundaries, on behalf of a nazirite with wine, even though he may not drink it. And one may establish an eiruv on behalf of an Israelite with teruma, although it is prohibited for him to eat it. Apparently, it is permitted for an Israelite to derive benefit from the teruma even though the verse says: “He shall not eat.” This appears to be a challenge to the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״תְּרוּמַתְכֶם״ — שֶׁלָּכֶם תְּהֵא. וְאִידַּךְ? ״תְּרוּמַתְכֶם״ — דְּכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל קָאָמַר. Rav Pappa said: It is different there, with regard to teruma, as the verse said: “And your teruma shall be reckoned unto you, as though it were the grain of the threshing floor, and as the fullness of the winepress” (Numbers 18:27). The Sages derived from the inclusion of the possessive pronoun “your” that the teruma shall be yours; therefore, it is permitted for an Israelite to benefit from teruma. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Ḥizkiya, derive from this phrase, as he holds that: “He shall not eat” already indicates that it is permitted to benefit from teruma? The Gemara answers: According to his opinion the phrase: “Your teruma” is referring to all of the teruma of the entire Jewish people. This is common biblical vernacular, and nothing may be derived from it.

וַהֲרֵי נָזִיר, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״מֵחַרְצַנִּים וְעַד זָג לֹא יֹאכֵל״, וּתְנַן: מְעָרְבִין לַנָּזִיר בְּיַיִן. אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״נִזְרוֹ״ — שֶׁלּוֹ יְהֵא. The Gemara continues to challenge Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition against the nazirite eating grape products, as the Merciful One says: “All the days of his naziriteship he shall eat nothing that is made of the grapevine, from the seeds to the grape skin” (Numbers 6:4). And we learned in the mishna: One may establish an eiruv on behalf of a nazirite with wine even though he may not drink it. Apparently, a nazirite may derive benefit from wine despite the fact that the verse says that he may not drink it. Mar Zutra said: It is different there, as the verse said: “His naziriteship.” He derives from this verse that it shall be his; in other words, the nazirite may continue to own wine and to benefit from it.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״קָדֹשׁ יִהְיֶה גַּדֵּל פֶּרַע שְׂעַר רֹאשׁוֹ״, גִּידּוּלוֹ קָדוֹשׁ, וְאֵין דָּבָר אַחֵר קָדוֹשׁ. מִידֵּי ״וְאֵין דָּבָר אַחֵר״ כְּתִיב?! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְמָר זוּטְרָא. Rav Ashi said: This halakha is derived from another source. As the verse says: “He shall be sacred, he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long” (Numbers 6:5). Rav Ashi reads the verse precisely to indicate that the growth of the nazirite’s hair is sacred and must be burned, but no other element of his naziriteship is sacred. In other words, he may derive benefit from the other elements prohibited to him during his naziriteship, i.e., from grape products. The Gemara challenges: And is it written: No other element of his naziriteship? There is no indication that this statement means that the prohibition against deriving benefit is limited to this one element. Rather, it is clear that the derivation of this halakha is in accordance with the explanation of Mar Zutra.

וַהֲרֵי חָדָשׁ, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֶחֶם וְקָלִי וְכַרְמֶל לֹא תֹאכְלוּ עַד עֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה״, וּתְנַן: קוֹצֵר לְשַׁחַת, וּמַאֲכִיל לַבְּהֵמָה! The Gemara continues to challenge Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition of new grain, which was harvested before the bringing of the omer offering, as the Merciful One says: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh stalks until this day itself, until you have brought the offering of your God; it is a statute forever throughout your generations in all your dwellings” (Leviticus 23:14). And we learned in a mishna: One may harvest grain before the omer as fodder and feed it to his animal. Apparently, one may derive benefit from this grain even though the verse says: “You shall not eat.”

אָמַר רַב שְׁמַעְיָה: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״קְצִירְכֶם״ — קְצִירְכֶם שֶׁלָּכֶם יְהֵא. וְאִידַּךְ? ״קְצִירְכֶם״ — דְּכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל מַשְׁמַע. Rav Shemaya said: It is different there, as the verse said: “Your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), indicating that your harvest will be yours. In other words, one may benefit from it, as it is still considered to be his. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Ḥizkiya, derive from this phrase? The Gemara answers that according to his opinion, “your harvest” is referring to the harvest of the entire Jewish people. This is common biblical vernacular, and nothing may be derived from it.

וַהֲרֵי שְׁרָצִים, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״שֶׁקֶץ הוּא לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, וּתְנַן: צַיָּידֵי חַיָּה וְעוֹפוֹת וְדָגִים שֶׁנִּזְדַּמְּנוּ לָהֶם מִינִין טְמֵאִין — מוּתָּרִין לְמוֹכְרָן לְגוֹיִם. שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לָכֶם״ — שֶׁלָּכֶם יְהֵא. The Gemara challenges both opinions. And yet there is the prohibition against eating creeping animals, as the Merciful One says: “And every creeping thing that swarms upon the earth is a detestable thing; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 11:41). And we learned in a mishna: If hunters of undomesticated animals, birds, and fish happen to catch non-kosher species that they did not intend to trap, it is permitted for them to sell them to gentiles. Apparently, one may derive benefit from non-kosher species even though the verse says: “It shall not be eaten.” The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse said: “For you” (Leviticus 11:10), indicating that they will be yours, that one may derive benefit from them.

אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה נָמֵי! שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״יִהְיוּ״ — בַּהֲוָיָיתָן יְהוּ. The Gemara asks: If so, that it is permitted to derive benefit from these creeping animals, then even if one intends to catch them it should also be permitted to sell them to gentiles ab initio. However, the mishna indicates that this is prohibited. The Gemara answers: It is different here, in the case of creeping animals, as the verse said: “They shall be” (Leviticus 11:11). It is derived from this that they shall be as they are. In other words, they should remain in their detestable state, and one should stay away from them.

וּלְחִזְקִיָּה, לְמָה לִי לְמִיכְתַּב ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, וּמַיְיתֵי ״לָכֶם״ לְמִישְׁרְיֵיהּ? לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, וְלָא בָּעֵי ״לָכֶם״! אָמַר לָךְ חִזְקִיָּה, טַעְמָא דִּידִי נָמֵי מֵהָכָא. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Ḥizkiya, why do I need the verse to write: “It shall not be eaten,” to teach that one may not derive benefit from them, and afterward to say: “For you,” to permit deriving benefit from them? Let the Merciful One not write: “It shall not be eaten,” and it will not need to say: “For you.” Ḥizkiya could have said to you: My reason is also derived from here, as this verse is a central source for my opinion. Since the verse needed to say explicitly: “For you,” it is evident that when the Torah writes only: “It shall not be eaten,” it is indicating that it is prohibited to benefit from the item as well.

וַהֲרֵי חָמֵץ, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל חָמֵץ״, וְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: תְּמַהּ עַל עַצְמְךָ הֵיאַךְ חָמֵץ אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה כׇּל שִׁבְעָה? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלֹא יֵרָאֶה לְךָ שְׂאוֹר״ — שֶׁלְּךָ יְהֵא. The Gemara further challenges the opinions of Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu: And yet there is the prohibition of leavened bread, as the Merciful One says: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten,” and it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Be astounded with yourself; how is it prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread for all seven days? Apparently, he holds that it is permitted for one to derive benefit from leavened bread for all seven days of Passover and certainly afterward. The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse said: “Matzot shall be eaten throughout the seven days; and no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your borders” (Exodus 13:7). The phrase “with you” indicates that it is yours, i.e., it is still considered to be in one’s possession, and it is permitted for him to derive benefit from it.

וְרַבָּנַן? שֶׁלְּךָ אִי אַתָּה רוֹאֶה, אֲבָל אַתָּה רוֹאֶה שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים וְשֶׁל גָּבוֹהַּ. וְאִידַּךְ? תְּרֵי ״לְךָ״ כְּתִיבִי. The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis, who say that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread, learn from the phrase “with you”? The Gemara answers: They derive that you may not see your own leavened bread; however, you may see that of others and that which is consecrated to God but remained in one’s possession. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, say about this halakha? The Gemara answers: There are two occurrences of the phrase “with you” written. One indicates that it is permitted to see leavened bread that belongs to a gentile, and the other indicates that one may derive benefit from leavened bread.

וְאִידַּךְ? חַד — בְּגוֹי שֶׁכִּיבַּשְׁתּוֹ, וְחַד — בְּגוֹי שֶׁלֹּא כִּיבַּשְׁתּוֹ. וְאִידַּךְ? תְּלָתָא ״לְךָ״ כְּתִיבִי. וְאִידַּךְ? חַד — בִּשְׂאוֹר, וְחַד — בְּחָמֵץ. וּצְרִיכִי. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the other Sages, the Rabbis, why is the phrase “with you” written twice? They explain: One is written with regard to a gentile whom he has conquered, i.e., who is under his control. And the other is written with regard to a gentile whom he has not conquered. In either case, one is permitted to keep the gentile’s leavened bread in his possession on Passover. And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, derive this halakha that one may see even the leavened bread of a gentile who is under his control? He points out that there are three occurrences of the phrase “with you” written. And what do the other Sages, the Rabbis, learn from the extra instance of the phrase “with you”? They learn that it is used once to teach about leaven, and once to teach about leavened bread. And they are both necessary and must be mentioned explicitly, as one cannot derive this principle with regard to leavened bread from leaven or vice versa.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי. ״יֵעָשֶׂה לְכׇל מְלָאכָה״, מַה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְכׇל מְלָאכָה״, שֶׁיָּכוֹל לִמְלֶאכֶת גָּבוֹהַּ יְהֵא מוּתָּר, לִמְלֶאכֶת הֶדְיוֹט יְהֵא אָסוּר, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְכׇל מְלָאכָה״ — דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי. The Gemara suggests: Let us say this dispute between Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu with regard to the implication of the phrase: It shall not be eaten, is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. The verse states: “And the fat of the animal carcass, and the fat of that which is torn of beasts, may be used for any other service; but you shall surely not eat of it” (Leviticus 7:24). What does it mean when the verse states: “For any other service”? I might have thought that with regard to the Temple service it should be permitted to use this fat for the following reason: Because fats may generally be offered on the altar, it is as though it is permitted to consume them; therefore, they may be used for other sacred purposes as well. However, I might have thought that with regard to common use it should be prohibited to use them, as the verse states: “You shall surely not eat of it.” Therefore, the verse states: “For any other service,” meaning that its use is permitted in all contexts. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: שֶׁיָּכוֹל לִמְלֶאכֶת הֶדְיוֹט יְהֵא טָהוֹר, לִמְלֶאכֶת גָּבוֹהַּ יְהֵא טָמֵא, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְכׇל מְלָאכָה״. Rabbi Akiva says: Although its use is clearly permitted, I might have thought that despite the fact that an animal carcass is impure, with regard to common use its fat should be ritually pure; however, with regard to the Temple service it should be ritually impure. Therefore, the verse states: “For any other service,” meaning that it is considered pure in all contexts.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה לָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא. כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא — לְאִיסּוּר וּלְהֶיתֵּר. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִיסּוּר וְהֶיתֵּר לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא — לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה. The Gemara explains their dispute: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that with regard to purity and impurity no verse is necessary, as there is no reason to assume that the fat of an animal carcass is impure. The verse is necessary to establish the prohibited or permitted status of this fat. And Rabbi Akiva holds that to teach whether this fat is prohibited or permitted no separate verse is necessary; it is necessary to establish its status with regard to ritual purity or impurity.

מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר: ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ״ מַשְׁמַע בֵּין אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה בֵּין אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה, וְכִי אֲתָא קְרָא לְמִישְׁרְיַיהּ לִנְבֵילָה — בַּהֲנָאָה הוּא דַּאֲתָא. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה — מַשְׁמַע, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה לָא מַשְׁמַע. וְכִי אֲתָא קְרָא — לְטוּמְאָה וְטׇהֳרָה. The Gemara asks: What, is it not that they disagree about this, the following issue? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds: “You shall not eat” indicates both the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of deriving benefit; therefore, one may not derive benefit from an animal carcass. And when the verse came and said: “For any other service,” it came to permit one to derive benefit from an animal carcass. And Rabbi Akiva holds: “You shall not eat” indicates that there is only a prohibition of eating; it does not indicate a prohibition of deriving benefit. Therefore, no verse is necessary to learn that it is permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass. When the verse came and said: “For any other service,” it came to teach about the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity. Apparently, there is a tannaitic dispute about the meaning of the words: “You shall not eat.”

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ״ מַשְׁמַע בֵּין אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה בֵּין אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה. וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר: כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה נְבֵילָה — הִיא הוּתְּרָה, חֶלְבָּהּ וְגִידָהּ — לֹא הוּתְּרוּ. וְכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא — לְהֶיתֵּר הֲנָאָה הוּא דַּאֲתָא. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה נְבֵילָה — חֶלְבָּהּ וְגִידָהּ נָמֵי הוּתְּרוּ. וְכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא — לְטוּמְאָה וְטׇהֳרָה. The Gemara rejects this assumption. No, it is possible to say that everyone holds that “You shall not eat” indicates both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit. And here, they disagree about this: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that when it was permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass, the carcass itself was permitted; however, its fat and its sinews were not permitted. And the phrase “for any other service” in the verse is necessary to permit one to derive benefit from this fat. However, Rabbi Akiva holds: When it was permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass, it was also permitted to derive benefit from its fat and sinews. Therefore, the phrase “for any other service” in the verse is necessary for the issue of purity and impurity.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, אַשְׁכְּחַן חֵלֶב דְּשַׁרְיֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בַּהֲנָאָה, אֶלָּא גִּיד נֵימָא דְּאָסוּר! אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָכִי נָמֵי דְּאָסוּר. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, מַיְיתֵי לַהּ בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה חֵלֶב שֶׁעָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת — מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, גִּיד שֶׁאֵינוֹ עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, we find that the Merciful One explicitly permits one to derive benefit from fat; however, let us say that the sinew of the sciatic nerve is prohibited. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that it is indeed so that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve. And if you wish, say instead that one is permitted to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives that the sciatic nerve is permitted through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to forbidden fat, for which one is punished with karet if he eats it intentionally, it is permitted to derive benefit, with regard to the sciatic nerve, for which the punishment for one who eats it is not karet, all the more so is it not clear that it is permitted to derive benefit?

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָסַר? אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ, מָה לְחֵלֶב שֶׁכֵּן הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ אֵצֶל חַיָּה, תֹּאמַר בְּגִיד שֶׁלֹּא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ אֵצֶל חַיָּה. The Gemara asks: And why does Rabbi Shimon, who prohibits deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve, not accept this a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: This inference can be refuted, as it is possible to say: What is unique to fat? It is that it is released from its general prohibition with regard to non-domesticated animals, as the prohibition only applies to the fats of kosher domesticated animals. Can you say the same with regard to the sciatic nerve, which is not released from its general prohibition with regard to non-domesticated animals and remains prohibited? Apparently, in some ways the prohibition of the sciatic nerve is more stringent than that of fat.

וְאִידַּךְ? בִּבְהֵמָה קָאָמְרִינַן — בִּבְהֵמָה מִיהַת לָא אִישְׁתְּרִי. The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, who permits one to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve based on this a fortiori inference, respond? The Gemara says: When we state this a fortiori inference, it is with regard to a domesticated animal; in any case, with regard to a domesticated animal its fat is not permitted. Since with regard to a domesticated animal the prohibition of fat is more stringent than that of the sciatic nerve, the a fortiori inference is valid.

מִכְּדֵי אוֹתְבִינְהוּ כׇּל הָנֵי קְרָאֵי וְשַׁנִּינְהוּ. חִזְקִיָּה וְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ בְּמַאי פְּלִיגִי! בְּחָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח וְאַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן, בְּשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל. חִזְקִיָּה נָפֵיק לֵיהּ מִ״לֹּא יֵאָכֵל״, וְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ נָפֵיק לֵיהּ מִנְּבֵילָה. After discussing numerous cases that involve prohibitions of eating and deriving benefit, the Gemara asks: Since we raised objections from all of these verses and answered them, and in every case it is apparent that despite the fact that the verse said: “You shall not eat” there was no dispute as to whether or not one may derive benefit from these items, then with regard to what issue do Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to leavened bread on Passover, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who prohibit one to derive benefit from it; and they disagree with regard to an ox that is stoned, in accordance with everyone. The Gemara explains: Ḥizkiya derived that it is prohibited to derive benefit in this case from the words: “It shall not be eaten,” and Rabbi Abbahu derived that it is prohibited from the fact that the Torah explicitly had to permit one to derive benefit in the case of an animal carcass.

מִכְּדִי בֵּין לְמָר וּבֵין לְמָר אֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה, מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בָּעֲזָרָה. חִזְקִיָּה סָבַר: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״ — לְמַעוֹטֵי הָנֵי, ״אֹתוֹ״ — לְמַעוֹטֵי חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה. The Gemara asks: Now, both according to the one Master and according to the other Master, it is prohibited to derive benefit from these items. The fact that they disagree about the source of this halakha notwithstanding, what is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to non-sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Ḥizkiya holds: “It shall not be eaten” comes to exclude these cases of leavened bread and the ox that is stoned. Although in most cases a prohibition against eating does not extend to a prohibition against deriving benefit, the language of the verse in these cases indicates that there is a prohibition against deriving benefit as well. Furthermore, “It shall be thrown to the dog” comes to exclude non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, indicating that it is prohibited to derive benefit from them.

רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ סָבַר: ״אֹתוֹ״ — לְמַעוֹטֵי הָנֵי, חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא נִינְהוּ. However, Rabbi Abbahu holds that according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintained that the prohibition against eating an animal carcass cannot be used to derive the prohibition against deriving benefit: “It shall be thrown to the dog” comes to exclude these two cases, leavened bread and an ox that is stoned, where deriving benefit is prohibited. And the prohibition to derive benefit from non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is not by Torah law, as there is no source from which to derive this prohibition. Therefore, the only practical difference between them is whether the prohibition of deriving benefit from non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law or by rabbinic law.

יָתֵיב הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: מִנַּיִן לְכׇל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה דְּכִי הֵיכִי דַּאֲסוּרִין בַּאֲכִילָה הָכִי נָמֵי אֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה? וּמַאי נִיהוּ — חָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל. מִנַּיִן?! תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִ״לֹּא יֵאָכֵל״! ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה — מַשְׁמַע לֵיהּ, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה — לָא מַשְׁמַע לֵיהּ. The Gemara relates: One of the Sages sat before Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, and he sat and said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: From where is it derived with regard to all the prohibitions in the Torah that just as it is prohibited to eat them, so too, it is prohibited to benefit from them? And what are the prohibited objects to which this statement refers? They are leavened bread on Passover and an ox that is stoned. The Gemara asks: Why ask from where? Derive the prohibition from the phrase: “It shall not be eaten.” The Gemara answers that he derived a prohibition of eating this item from: “It shall not be eaten”; however, he did not derive a prohibition of deriving benefit from this phrase.

תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִנְּבֵילָה?! סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: דְּבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן. The Gemara challenges: Derive this general prohibition against deriving benefit from the fact that the Torah had to explicitly permit one to benefit from an animal carcass. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said with regard to an animal carcass: The matters are as they are written, and the words in the verse do not indicate anything beyond their simple meaning.

אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מֵהֵיכָא דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מִ״לַּכֶּלֶב תַּשְׁלִיכוּן אֹתוֹ״! The Gemara challenges: If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then let him derive this halakha from where Rabbi Yehuda derives it, i.e., from the verse: “And you shall be sacred men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dog” (Exodus 22:30). Rabbi Yehuda expounded that one may throw it to a dog, but one may not throw any of the other prohibited items mentioned in the Torah to a dog. From this he infers that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread on Passover or from other similar items.

קָסָבַר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בָּעֲזָרָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. מִנַּיִן, דִּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל חַטָּאת אֲשֶׁר יוּבָא מִדָּמָהּ וְגוֹ׳״. The Gemara responds: This Sage holds that the prohibition to derive benefit from non-sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law, and that it is the word “it” in the verse that indicates they are prohibited. And from where is it derived that this prohibition against deriving benefit applies to leavened bread and to an ox that is stoned as well? As it is written: “And no sin-offering, of which any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to make atonement in the sacred place, shall be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire” (Leviticus 6:23).

שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בָּאֵשׁ תִּשָּׂרֵף״, וּמָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בָּאֵשׁ תִּשָּׂרֵף״? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְגוּפוֹ, דִּכְתִיב ״וְהִנֵּה שֹׂרָף״, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְכׇל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. As there is no need for the verse to state: “It shall be burnt with fire”; And for what purpose then does the verse state: “It shall be burnt with fire”? If it does not apply to the subject matter itself in its context, as it is already written: “And Moshe diligently inquired about the goat of the sin-offering, and, behold, it was burnt” (Leviticus 10:16), apply it to the matter of all the prohibitions in the Torah.